

UNSC

ACADEMIC GUIDE: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC)



MUNUR XVII
UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO

What is MUNUR XVII?



The Model United Nations at the Universidad del Rosario (MUNUR) is the first of its kind at the university level in Colombia. It is a space led and organized entirely by students and for students, designed to foster public speaking, critical thinking, and the development of solutions to the challenges of the international system. MUNUR invites its participants to explore the world, understand the issues of the present, learn from the lessons of the past, and imagine the responses that the future will demand.

Founded as an initiative by students at the Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario, MUNUR has, over the course of seventeen editions, established a tradition of academic excellence, leadership, and commitment. More than just a model, it is a community where people from different parts of the country and the world come together to strengthen friendships, promote diversity, celebrate inclusion, and demonstrate that respectful dialogue remains the most powerful tool for transforming realities.

For this seventeenth edition, we have decided to look toward the future without losing sight of what has defined us since our inception. Under the theme “Beyond Legacy, Towards Impact,” we seek to go beyond the legacy we’ve built over the years to make a real impact on every delegate, every committee, and every debate. We want this experience to not only develop better speakers and negotiators, but also leaders of integrity who are aware of their ability to transform their surroundings and contribute to a more just, cooperative, and sustainable world.

For this reason, MUNUR XVII offers a wide variety of committees designed to cater to different interests and levels of experience, with innovative activities that will challenge delegates to step outside their comfort zones, put their creativity, negotiation skills, and academic excellence to the test, and discover the true extent of their potential.

This document contains the necessary information for delegates interested in participating in this committee. It should be emphasized that the academic guidelines are merely a suggested research path developed by the Steering Committees. However, it is the responsibility of each participant to prepare thoroughly for the days of debate. We also remind you that all rules of procedure are set forth in this edition’s Handbook, which we recommend all participants read carefully.

At MUNUR XVII, we don’t just debate ideas: we develop leaders, inspire change, and demonstrate that our true legacy is the impact we have on others.

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WELCOME LETTER

Secretary General
Juan David Rincon





Hello, everyone!

My name is Juan David Rincón Vásquez, and in this edition of MUNUR, I have the privilege of serving as Secretary-General.

Whenever I came to this section of the guide, I used to skip it or simply not give it much thought; but today I see firsthand the work, effort, and dedication that come with having the honor of writing these lines. That's why, if you're reading this, I'm immensely grateful to you for recognizing the value behind every word.

If I had to describe my journey at MUNUR from day one in a single word, it would be: challenge. For many people, the word "challenge" may be synonymous with something negative; however, I am convinced that human beings only hone their skills and character when they face situations for which they may not feel fully prepared or that force them to step outside their comfort zone. In the four years I've been participating in this model, I can say that the moments when I've learned and grown the most always coincide with the same dates: late October and early November.

If this is your first time participating in the event, get ready for a truly life-changing experience. But best of all, you won't be alone throughout the process. At MUNUR and the Universidad del Rosario, we're known for doing everything with excellence but, above all, with deep human warmth. Rest assured that you'll see this reflected in every aspect of the model: from the team that will guide you through the registration process, to the tables and support centers that will be there for you at all times, to a Board of Directors fully dedicated to serving every delegate.

Take advantage of this opportunity to grow, debate, put your skills to the test, and, above all, build experiences and friendships that will stay with you for a lifetime.

A warm welcome to everyone at MUNUR XVII!

Juan David Rincón Vasquez

Secretary General of MUNUR XVII

WELCOME LETTER

Sub-secretary General
Andres Acosta





Dear delegates, sponsors, observers, and staff welcome to this new and extraordinary academic and personal experience. Participating in a Model United Nations conference means much more than simply representing a country or debating international issues. It means committing to the values of dialogue, cooperation, and the tireless pursuit of solutions to the challenges facing our global community.

Throughout each session, you will discover that a delegate's true greatness lies not only in delivering good speeches, but in the ability to listen, understand different perspectives, and build consensus.

As an International Relations student and a member of the MUNUR XVII organizing team, I have had the privilege of witnessing the profound impact these experiences have on those who participate in them. Model United Nations programs shape leaders of integrity, inspire vocations, and forge friendships that transcend borders. Through them, we learn that authentic leadership is exercised with humility, responsibility, and a commitment to service.

May this program be the beginning of new dreams and the setting in which you discover the full extent of your own potential. The future of international cooperation needs committed, creative, and courageous leaders, and I am convinced that each of you has the ability to contribute to building that future, and that this seventeenth edition will help you challenge yourselves.

I wish you every success and hope that this experience will remain in your memory as a lasting source of inspiration and growth.

Andrés Acosta

Sub-secretary General of MUNUR XVII

WELCOME LETTER

General Director
Santiago Sepulveda Perez





Dear delegates:

It is a true honor to welcome you to MUNUR XVII. As General Director, I am proud to welcome you to a new edition of this simulation, a forum that, over the course of seventeen editions, has brought together students committed to dialogue, critical thinking, and developing solutions to the challenges facing our world.

Each of you has decided to take on the challenge of representing a country, defending a position, and participating in debates that will require preparation, discipline, negotiation skills, and, above all, a willingness to listen. That decision demonstrates your interest in going beyond the classroom and becoming citizens with a global perspective and a genuine commitment to your community.

MUNUR is much more than a simulation of the United Nations. It is a setting where leadership, advocacy, teamwork, and conflict resolution skills are strengthened, but also where friendships are formed, unforgettable memories are created, and participants discover the enormous impact that a conversation can have when guided by respect and cooperation.

I invite you to take advantage of every committee, every speech, every caucus, and every informal conversation as an opportunity to learn and grow. Don't be afraid to defend your ideas, question your own perspectives, and build consensus. It is precisely these moments that make a Model United Nations a transformative experience.

I want to thank you for placing your trust in MUNUR XVII and for being part of this edition. Behind this Model United Nations stands a team that has worked diligently for months to offer you an academic and personal experience of the highest quality, and we hope that each of you will find here a space where you can challenge yourselves, learn, and enjoy yourselves.

Welcome to this new edition. I am confident that, with your commitment, enthusiasm, and talent, we will make MUNUR XVII a memorable experience.

I wish you every success and look forward to seeing you make your mark on this edition.

Sincerely,

Santiago Sepúlveda Pérez

General Director, MUNUR XVII

WELCOME LETTER

General sub-director
Carolina Echeverri Echeverria





Dear delegates:

I extend my warmest welcome to you all at MUNUR XVII. As General Sub-director, it is a privilege to greet you and to see how this model, now in its seventeenth edition, continues to be a breeding ground for critical thinkers, empathetic leaders, and young people committed to the future of our society.

Taking on the role of a nation's spokesperson and defending its interests requires courage, preparation, and discipline, but above all, a tremendous willingness to listen and build consensus. That determination that brings you here today is what makes a Model United Nations a truly transformative experience.

Beyond diplomatic rigor and committee debates, MUNUR is a setting for personal growth where networks are forged, friendships are formed, and lasting memories are created. I encourage you to make the most of every caucus, every statement, and every exchange to challenge yourselves, question perspectives, and learn from your peers.

Behind MUNUR XVII is an extraordinary team that has taken care of every detail to ensure you have an unforgettable academic and personal experience. Make the most of every space we have prepared for you.

I wish you the greatest success during this event. May your ideas and voices leave an indelible mark on this edition.

With appreciation and admiration,

Carolina Echeverri,

General Sub-director, MUNUR XVII

WELCOME LETTER

USG of Crisis committees

Gabriela Buelvas





Welcome to MUNUR XVII! My name is Gabriela Buelvas, and I am honored to be your Crisis USG for this year's event. During my attendance at two previous MUNUR editions, I've heard delegates describe MUNUR as challenging, rewarding, and determined, but above all, as an experience. What happens during those four days leads delegates to discover more about themselves, step outside their comfort zones, and leave the conference as completely transformed individuals.

Crisis committees, my area of expertise, are another unique experience. What I love most about these committees is how they address conflicts with innovative perspectives and in record time. The debates, directives, and motions aim to resolve problems in unprecedented ways, regardless of whether the committee is based on fantasy or not. Therefore, I feel that Crisis committees bring us closer to real life and its challenges. I hope that every delegate (and sponsor) who reads this will be more motivated to attend a committee meeting with the best possible preparation and attitude.

Having been in your shoes, I can offer several pieces of advice that I hope will be helpful. Preparation is key, be self-critical, and most importantly, believe in yourself no matter how many difficulties you face.

Don't forget to laugh once in a while,

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WELCOME LETTER

USG of Crisis Committees

Paula Suárez





Dear delegates,

It is an honor for me to welcome you to MUNUR XVII. My name is Paula Suárez, and I will be joining you as the Crisis USG. I currently have the privilege of studying Design at Universidad del Rosario, where I have found in graphic and industrial design a way to express my ideas and bring them to life through what I create with my own hands.

Since entering the MUN world, many people, upon learning about my field of study, have asked me why I am interested in this area. The answer is quite simple: I believe these spaces are full of learning and experiences that help us become our best selves through dialogue, active listening, and teamwork.

We hope that those who participate in this incredible Crisis USG will challenge themselves, demonstrate a high level of academic skill in conflict resolution, and seize every moment as an opportunity for growth.

Together with the entire Crisis USG Team at MUNUR XVII, we have prepared committees designed for you to have fun and learn, and, like us, fall in love with crisis committees. Our aim is for each of you to make the most of this experience, demonstrating initiative, adaptability, and your full potential within the committee.

Always remember: if you believe it, you can achieve it.

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Welcome letter from the Honorable Dais

Jurghenk Carrillo

Honorable Delegates,

Welcome to the United Nations Security Council at MUNUR.

My name is Jurghenk Carrillo, I am nineteen years old, and I am a law student at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. Over the past years, Model United Nations has become more than an academic activity for me; it has been a space that constantly challenges the way I think, argue, and understand the world around me.

The Security Council is not an ordinary committee. It demands precision, awareness, and, above all, responsibility. Here, words carry weight, decisions have consequences, and in many cases, inaction can be as significant as action itself. This is a space where diplomacy is tested under pressure, and where your ability to negotiate, adapt, and lead will define the course of debate.

For this committee, I do not expect perfection—I expect intention. I expect delegates who are willing to take risks, to defend their positions with solid arguments, and to remain open to changing their perspectives when the debate calls for it. The most memorable experiences in MUN rarely come from playing it safe, but from fully engaging with the moment.

Beyond the formalities, I encourage you to enjoy the process. Pay attention to every intervention, every directive, every informal debate. These are the details that shape not only the outcome of the committee, but also the experience you will take with you once it ends.

Thank you for choosing to be part of this space. I hope that by the end of the conference, you leave not only as better delegates, but with a broader understanding of the role you can play in complex global discussions.

Sincerely,

Jurghenk Carrillo

jurghenkarrillo@gmail.com

Welcome letter from the head of the Crisis Center

Samuel Escallón

Hello everyone, lastly, I'll present myself as head of the Crisis Center

My name is Samuel Escallón, however, many people recognizes me as Esca. I am 22 years old, and by this date I should've finished both my degree in Political Science at "La Nacho", an internship at JEP and starting a master's in education in the same institution.

This will be my second (and last) time as Crisis Director within the UNSC. I expect to have learned from my previous mistakes and bring all of you, not only a creative, but also a serious work that avoids as much disruptivity as I can, guaranteeing a high level performance in your deliberations, as well as a moved but peaceful space of debate.

Knowing that a couple or many of you aren't focused into Crisis Committees all I ask of you is growth, so that by the end of the conference you'll see how much everyone improved and became a better version of yourselves, being this the most authentic prove of success that you may find, and that no diploma of certificate could ever give you.

Finally, in a more personal level, I am known for my great sense of humour, my taste in music and movies, being Kendrick Lamar and Shrek my personal favourites, and as a fun fact, I must admit that in my 22 years of age I've never learned how to ride a bike, and I can assure you that in my five years left of life I won't learn how to.

Be safe, eat your vegetables, don't invest in Nvidia, and for any inquiries you'll find me at:

samuelescallon23@gmail.com or yaperconsultas@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is the oldest peacekeeping mission established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to prevent inter-communal violence between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in 1964.

To this day, UNFICYP remains in place and continues to work to reduce tensions between the two communities. Currently, both communities remain visibly divided, with no sign of a peace process, which is why UNFICYP remains active in maintaining peace in the buffer zone and carrying out humanitarian activities along Cyprus's buffer zone.

This document will guide you through the history of the conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, as well as the development and renewal of peacekeeping missions in Cyprus. It will also explore the role and importance of the Security Council (UNSC) in maintaining and renewing peacekeeping missions in an active conflict and how these relate to the global political situation.



UNSC

ABOUT THE COMMITTEE



INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) stands as the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security within the United Nations system. Established under the UN Charter in 1945, the Council holds the authority to determine the existence of threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression, and to decide upon measures ranging from diplomatic recommendations to economic sanctions and the authorization of military action (United Nations, 1945).



Taken from: UN News

Composed of fifteen member states, five permanent members with veto power and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms, the Security Council operates at the intersection of law, politics, and strategic interests. Its decision-making process reflects not only legal frameworks but also the geopolitical realities that shape international relations. As such, negotiations within the Council often require balancing national interests with collective security objectives, a dynamic that will be central to the development of this committee.

Within this framework, peacekeeping operations have become one of the most visible and complex tools available to the Security Council. Although not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, peacekeeping has evolved as a pragmatic mechanism to manage conflicts, monitor ceasefires, and support political processes in post-conflict or frozen-conflict scenarios (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). These missions rely on three fundamental principles: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2008).

The case of Cyprus represents one of the longest-standing engagements of the Security Council in the realm of peacekeeping. Since the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964, the Council has been continuously involved in efforts to prevent the recurrence of intercommunal violence and to maintain stability on the island. Over time, Cyprus has transitioned from an active conflict to what is often described as a “frozen conflict,” where tensions persist despite the absence of large-scale violence (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

In this context, the Security Council faces a fundamental challenge: how to adapt long-standing peacekeeping missions to evolving political realities. Questions surrounding mandate renewal, mission effectiveness, resource allocation, and the role of external actors remain central to ongoing debates. Particularly in 2026, shifting

geopolitical dynamics, regional security concerns, and the prolonged nature of the Cyprus dispute raise critical questions about the future of international peacekeeping efforts on the island.

This committee will simulate the Security Council under a crisis-oriented format while maintaining the procedural rigor of traditional debate. Delegates will be expected to engage with both the structural constraints of the Council and the fluid, unpredictable nature of crisis developments. This dual dynamic requires not only a strong understanding of institutional frameworks, but also the ability to respond strategically to rapidly changing scenarios.

Ultimately, the purpose of this committee is to provide delegates with a platform to navigate the complexities of international security decision-making. By engaging with the Cyprus peacekeeping mission, participants will confront broader questions regarding the effectiveness, legitimacy, and future of UN peace operations in protracted conflicts, issues that remain at the forefront of global governance today.

COMMITTEE HISTORY

The UNSC was established in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations as the primary body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Emerging from the geopolitical aftermath of the Second World War, the Council was designed to prevent the recurrence of large-scale global conflict through a system of collective security led by the major powers of the time. Its structure, particularly the inclusion of five permanent members with veto power, reflected the political realities of the post-war order and sought to ensure that the most powerful states remained engaged within a multilateral framework rather than acting unilaterally (United Nations, 1945).



Taken from: The Guardian

During its early years, the Security Council's effectiveness was significantly constrained by the dynamics of the Cold War. Ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union frequently resulted in the use of the veto, limiting the Council's ability to take decisive action in many conflicts. Nevertheless, the Council was still able to play a role in certain contexts, including the authorization of military intervention during the Korean War (1950), which remains one of the few instances in which the Council approved collective military enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter (Hanhimäki, 2008).

It was within this context of political standoff that the concept of United Nations peacekeeping began to emerge. Although not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter, peacekeeping developed as a pragmatic response to the limitations of both traditional diplomacy and enforcement action. Early missions, such as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed during the Suez Crisis in 1956, established key operational principles that would later define peacekeeping: neutrality, consent of the parties, and limited use of force (Bellamy & Williams, 2010).



UNEF (1956) Taken from: UN News

Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the Security Council increasingly relied on peacekeeping operations as a flexible tool to manage conflicts, particularly those that did not escalate into direct confrontation between major powers. It is within this broader evolution that the Council's involvement in Cyprus must be understood. The establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964 represented part of a growing trend in which the Council deployed missions to contain regional conflicts and prevent escalation, rather than to resolve them outright (United Nations Security Council, 1964).



Taken from: UNFICYP

The end of the Cold War marked a significant turning point in the history of the Security Council. With reduced ideological polarization among permanent members, the Council experienced a period of renewed activity and expanded its engagement in international crises. The 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the number, size, and scope of peacekeeping operations, including complex multidimensional missions in places such as Bosnia, and Cambodia. These missions went beyond traditional ceasefire monitoring to include state-building, electoral assistance, and humanitarian coordination (Bellamy & Williams, 2010).

However, this period of expansion also exposed significant limitations. Failures to prevent atrocities in

Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) raised serious questions about the effectiveness and mandates of peacekeeping missions, particularly in situations involving active conflict and mass violence. In response, the Security Council and the broader UN system undertook reforms aimed at strengthening peace operations, including clearer mandates, improved rules of engagement, and greater emphasis on the protection of civilians (United Nations, 2000).

In the 21st century, the Security Council has continued to adapt to an increasingly complex international security environment. Contemporary challenges, including terrorism, non-state armed groups, cyber threats, and protracted conflicts, have required the Council to balance traditional state-centric approaches with evolving realities. Peacekeeping missions have similarly evolved, often operating in environments where there is no clear peace to keep, raising questions about their long-term viability and strategic purpose.

Within this broader historical trajectory, long-standing missions such as UNFICYP occupy a unique position. Unlike newer and multidimensional operations, this force represents a more traditional model of peacekeeping, focused on maintaining stability and preventing escalation in a context where a political solution remains elusive. Its continued presence reflects both the enduring relevance of certain peacekeeping principles and the challenges associated with resolving deeply entrenched conflicts (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

Over time, the Security Council's approach to such missions has increasingly emphasized efficiency, adaptability, and political support processes. Regular mandate renewals, typically conducted every six months in the case of Cyprus, have become an institutionalized practice through which the Council reassesses mission priorities while maintaining continuity on the ground. At the same time, broader debates within the Council have questioned whether prolonged peacekeeping presences risk entrenching the status quo rather than facilitating meaningful political progress.

COMMITTEE COMPETENCE

The United Nations Security Council holds primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as established under Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations. Unlike other organs within the UN system, the Council possesses a unique combination of legal authority and political influence, allowing it to adopt decisions that are binding upon all Member States. This distinctive competence positions the UNSC at the center of the international security architecture, where legal norms, diplomatic negotiation, and geopolitical interests converge (United Nations, 1945).



Taken from: The Nation

The powers of the Security Council are primarily derived from Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter, which together define the spectrum of actions available to the Council in responding to international conflicts. Chapter VI, titled Pacific Settlement of Disputes, provides the Council with the authority to recommend procedures or methods of adjustment in situations that may endanger international peace and security. These include negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and other peaceful means agreed upon by the parties involved. Although these measures are not legally binding, they serve as a critical foundation for preventive diplomacy and often represent the initial stage of the Council's engagement in a dispute.

Chapter VII, in contrast, constitutes the most powerful legal basis for Security Council action. Under this chapter, the Council may determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and decide upon measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. These measures range from non-military actions, such as economic sanctions, arms embargoes, asset freezes, and travel bans, to the authorization of military force. The binding nature of Chapter VII resolutions distinguishes the Security Council from other international bodies, as Member States are obligated to comply with its decisions. This authority has enabled the Council to play a decisive role in major international crises, although its use remains subject to political negotiation among its members.

In practice, however, the application of these powers is far from straightforward. The distinction between Chapters VI and VII is often blurred, particularly in contemporary conflicts where situations evolve rapidly and do not fit neatly within traditional legal categories. As a result, the Security Council has developed flexible approaches that combine elements of both chapters, allowing it to respond to complex and dynamic security challenges.

One of the most significant manifestations of this flexibility is the development of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Although peacekeeping is not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter, it has emerged as a central instrument within the Council's competence. Often described as falling under "Chapter VI and a half," peacekeeping represents a hybrid mechanism that incorporates elements of consent-based diplomacy and limited enforcement. Through its resolutions, the Security Council establishes peacekeeping missions, defines their mandates, determines their scope of operations, and periodically reviews their effectiveness.



Taken from: UN Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping mandates have evolved significantly over time. Early missions were primarily limited to monitoring ceasefires and maintaining buffer zones between conflicting parties. However, contemporary peace operations frequently involve multidimensional tasks, including the protection of civilians, support for political processes, disarmament and reintegration of combatants, electoral assistance, and the strengthening of state institutions. This expansion reflects the Council's attempt to address not only the symptoms of conflict, but also its underlying causes.

In the specific case of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Security Council has exercised its competence through continuous mandate renewals since 1964. Unlike more recent missions, UNFICYP largely retains a traditional peacekeeping structure, focused on preventing the recurrence of hostilities, maintaining a buffer zone, and facilitating conditions for political dialogue. The persistence of this mission highlights both the adaptability of the Council's tools and the limitations of its capacity to achieve definitive conflict resolution (United Nations Security Council, 1964).

Despite its extensive authority, the competence of the Security Council is subject to significant practical constraints. Foremost among these is the veto power held by its five permanent members: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The veto allows any of these states to block the adoption of substantive resolutions, effectively granting them decisive influence over the Council's actions. While intended to preserve the participation of major powers within the UN system, the veto has frequently led to situations of irresolution, particularly in conflicts where the strategic interests of permanent members diverge.



Veto power at the security council. Taken from: The Japan Times

This political dimension fundamentally shapes the functioning of the Council. Decisions are rarely based solely on legal considerations; instead, they emerge from complex negotiations in which national interests, alliances, and geopolitical calculations play a central role. As a result, the Council's ability to act is often determined not by the severity of a crisis, but by the degree of consensus among its most powerful members.

In addition to internal political constraints, the Security Council must also operate within the broader framework of international law. Principles such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention impose normative limits on the Council's actions, particularly in situations involving internal conflicts. While Chapter VII provides a legal basis for intervention, its application remains highly sensitive and often contested, especially when it involves the use of force without the full consent of the state concerned.



Taken from: UNFICYP

The requirement of host state consent is particularly relevant in the context of peacekeeping operations. Traditional peacekeeping missions, including UNFICYP, rely on the consent of the parties involved, as well as adherence to the principles of impartiality and limited use of force. These constraints, while essential for maintaining legitimacy, can also restrict the effectiveness of missions in situations where parties are unwilling to cooperate or where the conflict remains unresolved.

Another important dimension of the Security Council's competence is its ability to collaborate with and delegate authority to regional organizations. Under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the Council may authorize regional arrangements or agencies to undertake actions in support of international peace and security. This has allowed for increased cooperation with organizations such as NATO, the African Union, and the European Union, reflecting a more decentralized and pragmatic approach to conflict management.

In recent decades, the scope of issues addressed by the Security Council has expanded considerably. Beyond traditional interstate conflicts, the Council now engages with challenges such as terrorism, transnational organized crime, cyber threats, and climate-related security risks. This expansion has reinforced the Council's central role in global governance, but has also generated debates regarding the limits of its mandate and the potential for institutional overreach.

By 2026, the Security Council can be understood as both extensive and inherently constrained. While it possesses unparalleled authority within the international system, its effectiveness ultimately depends on the interplay between legal mandates and political realities. Long-standing missions such as UNFICYP illustrate this tension, as they demonstrate the Council's capacity to maintain stability over extended periods, while also highlighting the difficulties of achieving comprehensive and lasting solutions.



Taken from: Cyprus Mail

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ABOUT THE TOPIC



“The ceasefire lines extend over 180 kilometres across the island. In the absence of a formal ceasefire agreement, UNFICYP’s 800-plus troops and 60-plus police officers deal with hundreds of incidents each year.” (United Nations, 2026) However, considering these lines are kept under permanent armed control, UNFICYP aims to support civilians’ normal life by helping with agricultural production, as well as to facilitate the energetic and water supply.



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Personal Representative

On December 26, 1963, the Permanent Representative of Cyprus met with the Secretary-General of the United Nations to discuss how they could restore calm in the country. As a result, the three nations (the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey) asked the Secretary-General to send a representative to oversee the peacekeeping missions in the territory.

After consultations, during which agreement was reached with all parties concerned regarding the representative's functions, the Secretary-General, on January 17, 1964, appointed Lieutenant General P. S. Gyani (India) as his personal representative and observer, to go to Cyprus initially until the end of February. (United Nations, 2025)

The representative's main duties would be to observe the progress of the missions and to report on ways to improve this oversight function in Cyprus.



Nicosia (1964). Taken from: Volkskrant

When the London Conference collapsed without an agreement on 15 January 1964, Cyprus rejected plans to reinforce the existing international peacemaking force, insisting it must be run by the United Nations. General Gyani reported that the situation was getting out of control. The island was plagued by scattered but deadly intercommunal fighting, kidnappings, executions of hostages, and rampant military violence. With the government machinery disintegrating, the communities completely divided, and threats of a Greek or Turkish military intervention growing, the British peacekeeping force found itself overwhelmed. Although General Gyani's efforts provided some temporary relief, it became clear that a full-scale UN peacekeeping mission was increasingly necessary.

On March 6, 1964, then-UN Secretary-General U Thant appointed Lieutenant General Prem Singh Gyani (India) as the force's first commander. Originally, the position was strictly military, while the political aspect fell to a mediator or special representative. Following the coup d'état on the island and the subsequent Turkish invasion, UNFICYP was redeployed to patrol the buffer zone, consolidating its humanitarian and military control functions under the UN mandate. That is how in August 1994, the United Nations unified leadership on the island. Since then, the mission has been headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who also assumed the role of Head of Mission, uniting under a single command the political leadership, diplomatic good offices, and operational command of the military troops.



Taken from: UN media

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The island of Cyprus, located in the eastern Mediterranean sea, has had a long history of conflict for dominance and multiple empires annexing this territory. Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Greeks and Romans having dominance through all of Antiquity. From 1192, when Guy de Lusignan acquired Cyprus from the Knights Templar to the Venetian Republic's control of the Kingdom from 1473 to 1571. Then, the Ottoman Empire captured Nicosia (its capital) and their fortified wall, to follow with the whole island in 1571 (Mallison, 2005).



Taken from: Wikipedia

The Ottomans rule was characterized by the “millet system”, in which every religion present was allowed to have its own authority. This caused a certain peace between Muslims (the majority until the 18th century) and Christians (who grew to 100,000 members around 1872), even though there was an objective to end the existence of the Catholic church in Cyprus to extend the dominance of the Orthodox. This rule also meant a major influx of Ottoman Turks settled in the island with many instances of forced Islam conversion, with Greece's independence war in 1821 being one of the biggest episodes (Mallison, 2013). It is worth mentioning that Cyprus among other islands were parts of the “Great Idea”, the desire of unifying all of the original ancient Greek's land.

The year of 1878 brought the lease from the Ottomans to the British Empire. According to Mallison (2013):

The main reason for Great Britain's seizure of the island in 1878 was to combat Russian influence in the Mediterranean and to protect its route to India; in the words of the renowned historian A. J. P. Taylor, Cyprus was acquired as a “fortress and to survey the volatile Anatolia (p.19).

The accord meant that while Britain could control Cyprus, the Ottoman Empire (which was significantly debilitated) could condone part of their debts. This rule was much better to its citizens, as autonomy was granted in matters of faith, even though the Orthodox were slightly bothered by the power given to Muslims, who were just the 18% of the population. (Mallison, 2013).

In 1914, after the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of Germany, the British annexed Cyprus and then offered it to Greece on the condition that Greece enter the war against Germany. When Greece finally entered the war on the side of the Allies in 1917, the offer was no longer valid (Mallison, 2013, p.20)

The above provoked that the nascent Turkish Republic gave away its claim over Cyprus to the United Kingdom (under the Treaty of Lausanne), meaning that it was declared a Crown Colony in 1925.

During the first decades of the twentieth century, a liberation movement (promoted by Greeks, who wanted an annexation of the Island) began boiling. The word “enosis”, that means union in Greek, is used to define that nationalist ideal that fomented issues with the British government and one of its major allies in the region, Turkey.



“Enosis” movement. Taken from: Kypros 1955

With the 50's, came a Cyprus who was more inclined to the enosis, but the government refused to negotiate with Greece. This is the first time this issue was brought to the General Assembly of the United Nations by the Greeks. But it was useless, as said by Mallison (2013):

Colonel Georgios Grivas, a Greek army officer of Cypriot origin, launched and led a guerrilla campaign through an organization called EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) on April 1, 1955, to expel the British and thus achieve enosis (p.22).

The British response was to work with the Turkish Cypriots and its government, and with more tension, came a fear of violence. To avoid UN intervention, the Brits came to a tripartite conference. It was an absolute disaster, as the Greeks thought that Turkey came as an observer, and a bomb was placed on the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki (Greece), causing more violence between both sides. This event meant the end of the Turkish-Greece diplomatic relations.

The Turks continued fighting for a plan: to demand a partition of the Island, with an established policy named "Taksim", that means division in Turkish. With the creation of the Turkish Defence Organization (TMT) in the 1950s, came a violent approach of exercising violence against Greek Cypriots, and even against Turkish Cypriots who were against the separation.



Turkish Defence Organization (TMT) . Taken from: KÜRE Ansiklopedi

Due to the United States's pressure to find a solution, the three nations came to a solution in 1960: an independent Cyprus:

The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey agreed on a preliminary plan for the independence of Cyprus, under the presidency of a Greek Cypriot and the vice-presidency of a Turkish Cypriot. The governments of Greece, Turkey, and Britain met in London on February 19 to finalize the agreements. These agreements, which would end British rule, included a constitution and three treaties: the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment. (Mallison, 2013, p.25).

These treaties created an atmosphere in which Cyprus maintained British military bases, created a Turkish-Greek army in the Island and compromised Britain, Greece and Turkey as responsible for its safety and sovereignty. This will not last.

As said by the Turkish Cypriot vice president of Cyprus: “Call it division, if you want”. The constitution was called dead, as both sides could not work together. All culminated in President Makario’s decision to bring the issues to the United Nations in 1964. On March 4th. the Security Council decides to adopt Resolution 186, which established:

Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. The Commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation. (United Nations, 1964, p.2).



UNFICYP Forces in Cyprus (1964). Taken from: Facebook

This force had an original period of stationing of three months, and had the purpose of preventing a “recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal condition”. But this did not stop Turkish forces to promote a self-separation in all forms of power, triggering Greek forces to be located on Cyprus in case of an invasion.

With a 1967 crisis (produced by a military coup in Greece), a threat of war between both states was brought again. This event led to two major outcomes: the retirement of the Island of a part of the Greek military army, and incentives were given to Turkish Cypriots so they returned to their homes. This helped to promote a certain peace, enough to start intercommunal conversations, promoted by the UN, in 1968. These were finalized in 1974.

Many reasons led to a Turkish coup d’état in July: the weakening of the Cypriot government, the fact that Britain had refused to comply with the Treaty of Guarantee, and a level of fanaticism to the Taksim. President Makarios survived, yet Turkish forces invaded Cyprus on July 20th, the same date that UNSC ordered the military intervention to stop and negotiations to begin again. Of course, it did not stop the expansion of the Turks, even with efforts of negotiation being held in Ginebra between the two states and Britain.



Turkish coup d’état Taken from: Knews

This invasion was ruthless: In August, more than 37% of Cyprus was occupied, with around 180,000 Greek Cypriots expelled from their homes to the south part of the Island and 20,000 more forced to displace (Mallison, 2013).

As requested in the Resolution 353 of that year, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom started discussion in late July at Geneva. The resulting document, the Geneva Declaration, stated the following:

A security zone of a size to be determined by representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, in consultation with UNFICYP, was to be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces. This zone was to be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP, which was to supervise the prohibition of entry.

All the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces were to be immediately evacuated and

would continue to be protected by UNFICYP. Other Turkish enclaves outside the area controlled by the Turkish armed forces would continue to be protected by an UNFICYP security zone and could, as before, maintain their own police and security forces.

In mixed villages, the functions of security and police were to be carried out by UNFICYP. Military personnel and civilians detained as a result of the recent hostilities were to be either exchanged or released under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) within the shortest time possible (UNFICYP, 1974).



The partition between Britain, Greece and Turkey as stated in the Geneva Declaration. Taken from: Military Histories, n.d.

The UNSC applied the Declaration on the Resolution 355 of that year, and gave the order to the UNFICYP to comply with the new orders. This meant that de facto the Island was partitioned between Northern and Southern Cyprus, with a 4% of the Island destined to the safety or “buffer” zone.

With a return of the Cyprus government in late 1974, Turkish troops remained on the northern portion, violating the Geneva Convention and worrying the international forces. The threat materialized with the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by the Turkish Cypriot parliament in 1983. This nation has only been recognized by their authors until this day.



Cyprus entrance to the European Community (EC). Taken from: Cyprus representations

The end of the twentieth century and the start of a new one came with relative peace. But with the application of Cyprus to be a member of the European Community (EC), predecessor of the European Union, even with Turkish threats. The debate of whether to accept the Island, angering Turkey who also was a candidate to join the EC, or not were held until May 1st of 2004, when the EC formally recognized as a formal member.

The worry of many that as the TRNC was still active, Turkey was now occupying a EC member was solved by the premise that: “Acquis communautaire in the occupied part of Cyprus would be suspended until this territory was reunified with the rest of the Republic, even if the entire Republic of Cyprus were a member of the EU” (Mallison, 2013, p.34).

This sparked new dialogues between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Britain and the United States (unofficially) with the UN promotion. In November of 2004, a referendum was held to see if the Annan Plan (named after the SG of the UN of the moment) could be applied. This plan consisted of:

This included, in some way, the arbitrary stipulation that Britain, Greece, and Cyprus would support Turkey's application for EU membership, which was an unacceptable violation of sovereignty. Another crucial aspect was that it meant the abolition of the original republic and the establishment of a new one, without the slightest guarantee of the withdrawal of the invading troops and illegal settlers, or of restoring the right of Cypriots to decide when and where to settle (Mallison, 2013, p.35).

With over 65% of the country voting NO, this plan was called invalid and it was considered to respond more to external interest to that of Cyprus.

Many things have happened since then: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) gave unilateral free movement to the other side, a wall that cutted the capital in Nicosia was demolished in 2008, reunification talks were held between 2015 and 2017. Since 2020, Turkey increasingly supports a two-state solution alongside Turkish Cypriot leadership has also supported this, meanwhile Cyprus, Greece, the EU and UN reject this.

Another event made this conflict even more complex: Since the 2000s, large gas reserves have been discovered around Cyprus with the Republic signing exploration agreements with international companies. Turkey disputes part of this claim, as their drilling missions have increased tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.



Taken from: Daily Sabah

Evolution of the renovations of the UNFICYP

Since its establishment through the Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), the United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has undergone significant transformation. Initially, its mandate focused on preventing further fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, maintaining law and order, and contributing to a return to normal conditions (UNSC, 1964).

Following the division of the island in 1964, successive mandates renewals expanded the mission's responsibilities. In addition to monitoring the ceasefire, UNFICYP became the supervisor of the buffer or safety zone. This role proved essential in reducing the risk of renewed hostilities and maintaining stability on the Island (UNFICYP, n.d).



Taken from: UNFICYP

Over the 20th and 21st century, Security Council renewals gradually broadened the scope of the mission. UNFICYP evolved from a traditional peacekeeping force focused primarily on military observation into a multidimensional operation that also promoted confidence-building measures, facilitates communication between two communities, supports humanitarian activities and helps manage incidents within the buffer zone. This evolution reflects the broader transformation of the United Nations peacekeeping operations from a simple ceasefire monitoring toward more comprehensive approaches to conflict management and peacekeeping (Chandra, 2016).

In the 2010s, renewals have placed increasing emphasis on supporting the Secretary General's good offices mission and encouraging confidence-building measures between two communities. Although UNFICYP has not succeeded in achieving the reunification of Cyprus or a comprehensive political statement, scholars generally agree that it has played a crucial role in preventing a return to large scale violence for more than fifty years, making it one of the longest-running and most successful conflict-containment mission in UN history (Fakili, 2023).



Taken from: Un peacekeeping Instagram



Taken from: Cyprus Mail

CURRENT CONTEXT

At the moment, UNFICYP has a budget for the 2024-2025 period of \$57,436,800 USD. According to the organization itself, its origins are as follows: “Today, one-third of UNFICYP’s budget is financed by the Government of Cyprus, while the Government of Greece contributes \$6.5 million annually. The rest is financed from contributions assessed on the entire membership of the United Nations, as decreed in 1993” (UNFICYP, n.d).

The following graph expands the division of human resources during that period of time:

	Military contingents	United Nations police	International staff	National Professional Officers	National General Service staff	Temporary positions ^b	United Nations Volunteers ^c	Government-provided personnel	Total
Executive direction and management									
Approved 2023/24	–	–	4	–	–	–	–	–	4
Proposed 2024/25	–	–	4	–	–	–	–	–	4
Components									
Political and civil affairs									
Approved 2023/24	–	–	13	7	13	1	–	–	34
Proposed 2024/25	–	–	13	7	13	1	–	–	34
Military									
Approved 2023/24	834	–	2	–	1	–	–	–	837
Proposed 2024/25	834	–	2	–	1	–	–	–	837
United Nations police									
Approved 2023/24	–	69	1	–	1	–	–	–	71
Proposed 2024/25	–	69	1	–	1	–	–	–	71
Support									
Approved 2023/24	26	–	19	–	100	1	–	–	146
Proposed 2024/25	26	–	19	–	100	1	–	–	146
Total									
Approved 2023/24	860	69	39	7	115	2	–	–	1 092
Proposed 2024/25	860	69	39	7	115	2	–	–	1 092
Net change									
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a Represents the highest level of authorized/proposed strength.

^b Funded under general temporary assistance.

^c Includes international and national United Nations Volunteers.

Proposed and Approved UNFICYP’s human resources in the 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 period. Taken from: UN Secretary-General, 2024

Moving to the tensions between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: they have been relatively small for decades, yet with the disputes between Turkey’s use of congested airspace and the election of a new TRNC’s president since October of 2025, Tufan Erhurman, has sparked debate because of his posture of possible reunification, departing from the “Taksim” that characterized all his predecessors. This has prompted renewed yet fragile dialogue with Nikos Christodoulides, Cyprus’s president (Gorvett, 2025).

Yet everything is not so bright: With more of Cyprus’s agreements for unilateral energy explorations, alongside purchase of arms acquisitions. The Turkish Cypriot government claims that the State of Israel has been behind the militarizing of the Greek Cypriots, and in September of 2025, expresident of the TRNC, Ersin Tatar, met with UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, to discuss his worry for the safety of the Turkish part of the Island (Daily Shabah, 2025).

It is worth noting that external factors, such as the conflict present in the Middle East, like the war between Russia and Ukraine, as Cyprus's support towards a pro-EU stance has brought resentment towards a very pro-Russia Turkey. The armed conflict that involves Palestine and Israel is also a sensitive topic as the Turks have reaffirmed its support towards Palestine and condemned Israel's actions, meanwhile Cyprus has been strengthening its economic links towards Israel and has a more neutral approach towards the territory of Palestine (Dincel, 2025; Piper, 2024; Singer, 2025).

With the Resolution 2771 (2025) declaring that the UNFICYP's mandate expires on January 31st of 2026, debates between the utility of the renewal and which conditions and functions of not only the UNFICYP but the negotiations between Greek and Turks Cypriots (UNSC, 2025).

CURRENT SITUATION

CONTEXT

The Cyprus conflict has entered a period in which stability may no longer be enough to preserve the status quo. For decades, the absence of large-scale fighting has allowed the division of the island to become increasingly institutionalized, while political negotiations have repeatedly failed to overcome fundamental disagreements over sovereignty, security, territory, and governance. The result is an unusual security environment for Cyprus since the country is not experiencing open war, yet the conditions that originally required international intervention have never been fully resolved. UNFICYP has therefore become not only a mechanism for preventing violence, but also a physical reminder of a political dispute that remains unsettled.

This fragile equilibrium is now being challenged by developments beyond the traditional boundaries of the Cyprus dispute. Competition over offshore energy resources has connected the island's future to wider tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, where maritime claims, military capabilities, and relationships with regional powers increasingly overlap. At the same time, the changing political landscape within the Turkish Cypriot community creates the possibility of renewed engagement, but also raises difficult questions about what kind of settlement could realistically be achieved. Any deterioration in relations could therefore have consequences extending beyond Cyprus itself, affecting regional security, energy interests, and relations between NATO members and other major actors.

The Security Council is now confronted with a rapidly developing situation. An incident in the buffer zone has escalated beyond the capacity of local authorities to contain it, while both communities accuse the other of deliberately provoking the confrontation. Reports of additional military movements near sensitive areas have begun circulating, and a dispute over access to a strategic offshore zone threatens to draw regional actors directly into the crisis. With communication between the parties deteriorating and UN personnel increasingly exposed to the consequences of escalation, the Council must act before a limited confrontation develops into a broader security crisis. It is essential, not only to determine a political wayout to restore calm in the region, but also to make it clear to the international community that the existing institutions and international framework are capable of preventing Cyprus from becoming the next tragic headline in the international news.

FAMAGUSTA, 19 FEBRUARY 2026

The tense calm in the Eastern Mediterranean shattered completely this morning following the outbreak of serious armed clashes along the Green Line, specifically in the walled district of Varosha, triggering an unprecedented humanitarian and civil security crisis. After weeks of verbal hostilities over unauthorized construction work by Turkish Cypriot forces within the buffer zone, the exchange of fire in recent hours has forced the government of the Republic of Cyprus to begin the urgent mass evacuation of thousands of Greek Cypriot civilians from the surrounding neighborhoods of Famagusta. Schools and businesses in the eastern part of the island remain closed amid widespread panic that evokes the worst traumas of the 1974 invasion.

In New York, the United Nations Security Council has just convened an emergency closed-door session to address what is already being described as a flagrant violation of the international status quo and the landmark resolutions 550 and 789. The situation on the ground is critical for UNFICYP; the peacekeepers deployed in the sector are caught in the crossfire as they attempt to reestablish the security perimeter. Diplomatic sources confirm that several UN patrols have been attacked and blocked by Turkish Cypriot military bulldozers north of Varosha, repeating the dangerous pattern of hostility seen in Pyla, but on a far more destructive urban scale that threatens to immediately collapse the peacekeeping mission's mandate. The military escalation has raised alarms at the highest levels of NATO, given the imminent risk of a direct armed clash between Greece and Turkey. The government in Athens has activated its mutual defense protocols with Nicosia and placed its naval fleet in the Aegean Sea on high alert, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the invading troops.

For its part, the Ministry of Defense in Ankara has responded by mobilizing armored units toward the demarcation line in northern Cyprus, securing access to Varosha and justifying its operations as a defensive response. This dangerous move threatens to irreversibly fracture the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, forcing a desperate diplomatic intervention by Washington and London to avert open warfare between two of its members.

At this point, the peace process led by the UN Secretary-General is considered virtually dead, while the island's economy grinds to a halt. The port of Famagusta and adjacent trade routes have been closed due to the risk of artillery fire, completely halting maritime trade and causing the indefinite suspension of operations on natural gas exploration platforms in the waters south of the island. With diplomatic channels completely severed in Varosha, authorities in the north of the island have suggested that this move consolidates the permanent division of the territory, transforming the former buffer zone into a high-intensity militarized border that effectively ends fifty years of international reunification efforts.



Taken from: Xinhua

RELEVANT ACTORS

United Nations security council:

The Security Council establishes a peacekeeping operation by adopting a Security Council resolution. This resolution sets forth the mission's mandate and scope.

The Security Council continuously monitors the work of peacekeeping operations, which includes receiving periodic reports from the Secretary-General and holding special sessions dedicated to reviewing the work of specific operations.

The Security Council may vote to extend, amend, or terminate mandates as it deems appropriate.

Under Article 25 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations agree to accept and comply with the decisions of the Security Council. While other United Nations bodies make recommendations to Member States, only the Council has the power to adopt decisions that Member States are obligated to implement. (United Nations, 2026)

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP):

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus is a multinational peacekeeping mission under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council that has been deployed in Cyprus since 1964.

Khassim Diagne:

On September 3, 2025, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres announced the appointment of Khassim Diagne of Senegal as his new Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

Turkish Cypriot communities:

By definition, a Turkish Cypriot is a person from Cyprus who is of Turkish descent or speaks Turkish as their primary language. Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Cypriot Constitution states that “the Turkish community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish, who share Turkish cultural traditions, or who are Muslim.” According to the 2006 census, there were an estimated 145,443 Cypriots claiming Turkish heritage across the island of Cyprus.

Following the collapse of the joint government and the division of the island in 1974, the Turkish Cypriot community established its own institutions in the northern part of Cyprus and proclaimed itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Which means nowadays Turkish Cypriots do not have effective representation on Cyprus government, as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognized internationally as a country.

Greek Cypriot communities:

They are the ethnic Greek population of Cyprus, which constitutes the largest ethnolinguistic group on the island. Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Cypriot Constitution states that “the Greek community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek, or who share Greek cultural traditions, or who are members of the Greek Orthodox Church.” According to the 2011 Cypriot cen-

sus, 659,115 people in the area controlled by the Republic of Cyprus—excluding the population of Northern Cyprus, or Turkish Cypriots—identified as Greek Cypriots, representing 78% of the population. Following the inter-community clashes the administration of the Republic of Cyprus has been in Greek Cypriot hands.

Cyprus:

Although it is an internationally recognized state, it controls only two-thirds of the island. The remaining third (the northern part of the island) was occupied by Turkey in 1974, which established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Only Turkey recognizes this territory. The island is also home to the British military bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia.

Greece:

Along with Turkey and the United Kingdom, Greece signed the 1959 Treaties of Zurich and London, which led to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. As a guarantor power, Greece bears legal and historical responsibility for the island's sovereignty and independence.

The establishment of UNFICYP in 1964 and its subsequent restructuring following the Turkish invasion of 1974 directly affected the sovereignty that Greece was obligated to co-guarantee. For this reason, Greece is in constant contact with the UN mission to ensure that international resolutions are respected. Due to its close ties with the Greek Cypriot population and its interest in the island's stability, it makes voluntary financial contributions toward the maintenance of UNFICYP. The Cypriot government with Greece's help covers approximately one-third of the total cost of the operational mission to ensure that the UN does not withdraw due to a lack of funds.

Turkey:

Turkey exercises absolute control over the northern side of the buffer zone through the Turkish Armed Forces. The UN must constantly negotiate access and maintain UNFICYP's mandate directly with the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the Turkish government. As a result, the Turkish government frequently protests the renewal of UNFICYP's mandate. During its annual and semi-annual renewals, Turkey argues that the UN must administratively recognize the northern authorities, which often leads to diplomatic disagreements between Ankara and the international community.

United Kingdom:

Cyprus gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, but the British maintained military bases on the island. When intercommunal violence broke out in late 1963, the United Kingdom deployed its own peace-keeping force alongside Greece and Turkey, but it was unable to contain the situation. To prevent an open war between two NATO members (Greece and Turkey), the United Kingdom itself pushed for and helped draft UN Security Council Resolution 186 in March 1964, which established UNFICYP.

SPECIAL PROCEDURE

VETO POWER

With regard to the use of the veto, the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) shall have the power to veto public directives and draft resolutions. To this end, any negative vote cast by a permanent member shall count as a veto before the Council, for which the following procedure shall apply:

1. If a veto is cast during a voting process, the dais shall call on representatives in the order listed.
2. The two representatives from the country that cast the veto shall have 2 minutes (exactly 1 minute per representative) to explain the reasons for vetoing the document.
 - 2.1. If there is only one representative, that representative shall use the entire 2 minutes solely to explain the reasons for their vote.
3. The dais will assess the justifications and take them into account when evaluating the delegation's performance, either positively or negatively.

Consequently, it is established that:

1. The veto does NOT apply to decisions that are purely 'procedural' in nature.
2. The exercise of the right of veto by any of the five permanent members of the Security Council will prevent the relevant document from being considered or adopted during the committee's proceedings immediately.
3. If the dais considers that permanent members are abusing this right, it may suspend the use of the veto for as long as it considers necessary.
 - 3.1. The suspension of the veto does not mean that permanent members will be unable to vote on documents within the committee; rather, their vote will carry the same weight as that of any other committee member and will be taken into account by a simple majority.

If a permanent member does not fully agree with a draft resolution or document, but does not wish to cast a veto, they may choose to abstain, which allows the resolution to be adopted.

QUESTIONS

- Is the continued renewal of UNFICYP a solution, or merely a mechanism to indefinitely manage the conflict? Under what conditions should the Council reconsider its mandate?
- How can a state justify a modification (expansion, reduction, or transformation) of the mission's mandate without triggering opposition from key actors in the Council?
- In a scenario where one of the parties alters the status quo (territorial, political, or military), how should the Security Council respond without escalating the conflict further?
- What specific measures—beyond peacekeeping—can a state propose to actively move the conflict toward resolution rather than containment?
- How will a state navigate the political interests of the permanent members, particularly in situations where a proposed solution risks being vetoed?
- To what extent is neutrality still viable in peacekeeping operations, and when—if ever—should the Council endorse a more assertive or partial approach?

Veto Power: The ability of the five permanent members (USA, UK, France, Russia and China) of the Security Council to block the adoption of any substantive resolution.

Peacekeeping Operation: A UN mechanism involving the deployment of international personnel to help maintain stability and prevent the escalation of conflict.

Mandate: The set of tasks, objectives, and limits assigned to a UN mission by the Security Council, subject to periodic renewal.

UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, established in 1964 to prevent further conflict and maintain stability on the island.

Buffer Zone (Green Line): The UN-controlled demilitarized area separating the Greek Cypriot south and the Turkish Cypriot north.

Frozen Conflict: A situation in which active large-scale violence has ceased, but no comprehensive political solution has been achieved.

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC): A self-declared state recognized only by Turkey, considered legally invalid by the international community.

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs): Actions aimed at reducing tensions and fostering trust between conflicting parties without resolving the core dispute.

Peace Enforcement: The use of coercive measures, including military force, authorized by the Security Council to maintain or restore peace.

Host State Consent: The approval required from the state(s) involved for the deployment and operation of a peacekeeping mission.

Rules of Engagement (ROE): Directives that define the circumstances under which peacekeeping forces may use force.

Sanctions Regime: A system of economic or political restrictions imposed by the Security Council to influence behavior of states or actors.

GLOSSARY

Bicommunal Negotiations: Peace talks involving representatives of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Territorial Integrity: The principle that a state's borders should not be altered by force or external intervention.

Mandate Renewal: The periodic extension and revision of a peacekeeping mission's authorization by the Security Council, often reflecting political priorities.



GLOSSARY

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
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